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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Derrick Lawrence Hughes appeals from the summary dismissal of his Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, contending that the district court erred in dismissing the following claims that 
Mr. Hughes' attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by: 
1. not being present during a psychosexual evaluation, including a polygraph, which 
was used to predict future dangerousness, and, therefore, violated his Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights; 
2. not being present during psychosexual evaluation, including a polygraph, which 
was used to predict future dangerousness, and, therefore, violated his Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights; 
3. failing to insure that the defendant had his Miranda1 rights read to him prior to his 
"PSI investigation;" 
4. failed to file a motion to suppress the polygraph; and 
5. did not insure that defendant had an independent psychiatrist as part of the 
psychosexual evaluation, when the defendant had a right to the assistance of an 
independent psychiatrist and thus, did not determine, prior to sentencing, what 
"claims should be presented to the fact-finder or in interpreting the reports [sic] 
findings or rebutting the states [sic] evidence." 
He also contends the district court erred in finding that no prejudice inured to Mr. Hughes 
despite a finding that his attorney rendered deficient performance vis a vis the psychosexual 
evaluation for failing to provide Estrade( warnings. 
Mr. Hughes requests that this court provide the correct legal analysis of the above issues, 
and, where necessary, remand this case for appropriate factual findings. 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 
2 Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007). 
Appeals affirmed Mr. Hughes' judgment and sentences. See State v. Hughes, 2005 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 633 (Ct. App., Oct. 26, 2005). 
On November 14, 2006, Mr. Hughes timely filed his Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
(hereinafter, Petition), and affidavit in support of his Petition. (R., pp.7-31.) In his Petition, 
Mr. Hughes alleged, among other claims, that his attorney was ineffective for: 
1. not being present during a psychosexual evaluation, including a polygraph, 
which was a critical stage and was used to predict future dangerousness, and, 
therefore, violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights (R., pp.8, 15, 
18-19); 
2. not being present during psychosexual evaluation, including a polygraph, with 
which violated his right against self-incrimination and was used to predict 
future dangerousness, and, therefore, violated his Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights (R., pp.8-9, 18-20); 
3. failing to insure that the defendant had his Miranda3 rights read to him prior to 
his "PSI investigation" (R., pp.9, 27-28); 
4. failed to file a motion to suppress the polygraph (R., p.15); and 
5. did not insure that defendant had an independent psychiatrist as part of the 
psychosexual evaluation, when the defendant had a right to the assistance of 
an independent psychiatrist and thus, did not determine, prior to sentencing, 
what "claims should be presented to the fact-finder or in interpreting the 
reports [sic] findings or rebutting the states [sic] evidence." (R., pp.8;21.) 
Along with his Petition, Mr. Hughes filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which 
was granted by the district court. (R., pp.38-42.) The State filed a Brief in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss. (R., pp.55-80.) Appointed counsel then filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief(hereina.fter, Amended Petition) and an additional affidavit. (R., pp.49-51, 115-118.) In 
the Amended Petition, counsel realleged, and incorporated by reference, the claims made in 
Mr. Hughes' Petition, and raised several additional issues. Post conviction counsel also filed a 
privilege against self-incrimination rather than the specific Miranda warnings. (R., p.143.) 
Without deciding whether this was true, the court held that even if it was true and no warnings 
were given, there could be no finding of deficient performance because, relying on Stuart v. 
State, 145 Idaho 467, 180 P .2d 506 (Ct. App. 2008), the presentence investigation is not a critical 
stage, and therefore, he had no right to the advice of counsel during the pre-sentence 
investigation report. (R., p.144.) The court also found that Mr. Hughes had waived any Fifth 
Amendment claim in the pre-sentence report because he made no "showing that he protested to 
participating in the PSI." (R., p.142.) 
3. Regarding the motion to suppress issue, while the district court did not 
specifically address this issue, it granted the State's Motion to Dismiss in its entirety (R., p.133), 
thus adopting the State's reasoning on this issue. The State argued that, "Petitioner fails to 
present why the 'polygraph should have been suppressed at court,' so it is not possible to 
evaluate whether the lack of suppression was ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner's 
allegations fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding deficient performance, let alone 
resulting prejudice, and therefore none are sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing." 
(R., pp. 72-73.) 
4. As it related to Mr. Hughes claim that he should have been granted an 
independent psychiatrist, that in fact, counsel had objected to the evaluation and asked for a new 
one to be prepared (R., p.142), the court held that if the denial of a new evaluation was 
erroneous, it was the doing of the district court and, therefore, should have been raised in direct 
appeal. (R., p.142.) The court did not address the second part of the claim wherein Mr. Hughes 
alleged his attorney should have obtained a confidential evaluation and reviewed it with 
Mr. Hughes prior to its release to the court and the State. (R., p.143.) 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court erroneously analyze Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel for failing to be present of counsel during any or all phases of a 
psychosexual evaluation? 
2. Did the district court incorrectly analyze Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to move to suppress the 
psychosexual evaluation because the polygraph results were obtained in violation of his 
fifth amendment right to the assistance of counsel? 
3. Did the district court erroneously dismiss Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance when he failed to provide or insure that generalized warnings of the 
right against self-incrimination were given to Mr. Hughes prior to his participation in a 
pre-sentence evaluation? 
4. Did the district court erroneously dismiss Mr. Hughes' claim that his trial attorney 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress the 
results of the polygraph test? 
5. Did the district court erroneously dismiss Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain an independent, confidential 
evaluation such that the evaluation could be reviewed by Mr. Hughes and his counsel 
prior to the release of that information to the district court and the State? 
6. Did the district court, although correctly finding that Mr. Hughes' attorney rendered 
deficient performance for failing to advise his client regarding participation in the 
psychosexual evaluation, err when it incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and thus, erroneously dismissed that claim? 
intent to dismiss must give notice of any deficiencies in the petitioner's evidence 
or any legal analysis that he needs to address in order to avoid dismissal of his 
action. 
Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 440-441, 128 P.3d 975,977 - 978 (Ct. App. 2006.) 
1. The District Court Incorrectly Analyzed Mr. Hughes Claim That He Had The 
Right Pursuant To The Sixth Amendement To The Presence Of Counsel During 
All Phases Of The Psychosexual Evaluation 
In his Petition, Mr. Hughes alleged his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
violated. (R., p.8.) He further elaborated by alleging, among other claims, that his attorney was 
ineffective for not being present during a polygraph, which was used to predict future 
dangerousness (R., pp.8, 15, 18) and not being present during the psychosexual evaluation, 
which was a critical stage and which was used to predict future dangerousness. (R., pp.9, 18-20.) 
The district court held that, with regard to his request for counsel's presence during the 
polygraph, "Hughes did not take a pretrial polygraph. He did take one as part of his 
psychosexual evaluation. There is no merit to this claim." (R., p.138.) The Court, however, 
correctly recognized that Mr. Hughes was raising this claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, 
and correctly determined that Mr. Hughes had the right to the assistance of counsel as articulated 
in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007). However, because the Court thereafter 
determined that no prejudice inured to Mr. Hughes, the post conviction court did not assess 
whether the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel necessarily included the 
presence of counsel or was limited only to the advice of counsel. By erroneously analyzing the 
prejudice prong, and thereafter, failing to address the deficient performance prong, the court 
erred in its analysis and subsequent dismissal of this claim. 
the Sixth Amendment right to the advice of counsel was different than the Sixth Amendment 
right to the assistance of counsel based on the "difference between the 'limited right to the 
appointment and presence of counsel recognized as a Fifth Amendment safeguard in Miranda' 
and a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel." Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 
149 P.3d 832 (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471). This reliance is misplaced, as the Fifth 
Amendment right is completely separate from, and analyzed differently than, a right to counsel 
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Importantly, Estelle never held that the Fifth Amendment 
right is more limited than the Sixth Amendment right; it never analyzed the Fifth Amendment 
issue at all, because the court found the Sixth Amendment provided the constitutional basis for 
the opinion. 
In Estelle, the issue was whether the use of the petitioner's uncounseled and unwarned 
statements obtained during a competency evaluation could be used against him during the 
sentencing phase of a capital murder case to establish his future dangerousness. Estelle, 451 
U.S. at 461. These allegations of error encompassed a claim that the statements were obtained in 
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights because he wasn't given Miranda warnings before 
engaging in the interview and a claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he 
did not receive the "assistance of counsel before submitting to the pretrial psychiatric interview." 
Id. at 461,469. 
In evaluating the Sixth Amendment claim, the Court noted that Mr. Smith's "Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel 'clearly had attached when Dr. Grigson examined him."' Id. at 470. 
Because the court found that the interview was "conducted after adversary proceedings have 
been instituted, we are not concerned in this case with the limited right to the appointment and 
presence of counsel recognized as a Fifth Amendment safeguard." Id. at 471. The Court 
found that the time period in which the psychosexual evaluation occurred was a critical stage. 
Id. The right to the presence of counsel applies equally to out-of-court interrogations once the 
adversarial proceedings have been initiated and the client is represented by counsel. Beginning 
with Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), a long line of cases reaffirmed this right. In 
Massiah, the Court noted, 
[ A J Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at such a trial 
could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the 
police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less, it was said, might 
deny a defendant "effective representation by counsel at the only stage where 
legal aid and advice would help him." 
Id. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959)). The Court further held that, 
"the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against 
him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately 
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel." Id. at 206. 
In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-630 (1986), the court held, "The arraignment 
signals 'the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings' and thus the attachment of the Sixth 
Amendment, thereafter, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including 
interrogation, represent 'critical stages' at which the Sixth Amendment applies." Moreover, the 
Court reiterated that once counsel was requested, the client need not renew that request, "[WJe 
presume that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the 
prosecution. We thus reject the State's suggestion that respondents' requests for the appointment 
of counsel should be construed to apply only to representation in formal legal proceedings." Id. at 
633. The Court further explained that it would apply the presumption because the right to 
counsel did not turn upon a request for counsel, but instead continued without renewal following 
the initial appointment. Id. The Court noted that a request for counsel was "an extremely 
performed by the judge, as part of the formal sentencing hearing. Functionally, 
the investigation is part of the sentencing procedure. 
Id. at 300 (citing State ex rel. Russell v. Jones, 647 P.2d 904, 906 (Or. 1982)). In Jones, the 
court held that the "defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel to the same degree when the 
judge seeks sentencing information from him in open court as when the judge does so indirectly 
through the out-of-court agency of a probation officer." Jones, 647 P.2d at 906. Certainly, 
Mr. Hughes was as entitled to counsel in this extra-judicial hearing as he would have been had 
the court attempted to elicit this information during court. 
4. The District Court, Although Recognizing That Mr. Hughes Had Asserted A 
Sixth Amendment Right To The Presence Of Counsel During The Psychosexual 
And Polygraph Evaluation, Did Not Address This Claim Of Deficient 
Performance, Instead, Finding Only That Preiudice Did Not Inure To Mr. Hughes 
In the case at bar, Mr. Hughes alleged that his counsel failed to adequately represent him 
by not being present during the psychological evaluation4, which was used to predict future 
dangerousness.5 (R., pp.8-9, 18-20). The court found this factual allegation to be true. 
(R., p.148.) Mr. Hughes further asserted that the psychosexual evaluation and the polygraph, to 
4 Although Mr. Hughes appears to generally assert the right to the presence of counsel, for 
purposes of his case, it is analyzed under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendement. As noted in 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,633, (1986), "Although judges and lawyers may understand 
and appreciate the subtle distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, 
the average person does not. When an accused requests an attorney, either before a police officer 
or a magistrate, he does not know which constitutional right he is invoking; he therefore should 
not be expected to articulate exactly why or for what purposes he is seeking counsel. It makes 
little sense to afford relief from further interrogation to a defendant who asks a police officer for 
an attorney, but permit further interrogation to a defendant who makes an identical request to a 
judge. The simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney indicates that he does not believe 
that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly." Id. at Fn. 7 
~internal citations omitted). 
While the client calls it a "psychological evaluation," it is clear that he is referencing the 
psychosexual evaluation, as the psychosexual evalauation is the only evaluation the court 
ordered. The district court also treated claims alleging errors in the "psychological" evaluation 
-- -----~ -11.-.. ..... : .... ,.... +..-.. +ho. "..-..c,u,-,.h.n.c--Avm:::al Pu!:'!ln~tinn " (R __ nn.113-154.) 
5. The District Court Incorrectly Analyzed The Prejudice Prong Of Mr. Hughes' 
Claim Oflneffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Mr. Hughes alleged that he was deprived of the presence of counsel during the 
psychosexual evaluation, which was a critical stage. (R., pp.8, 19.) The court, also found that 
Mr. Hughes claim that his attorney was not present during the psychosexual evaluation, 
including the polygraph, was "uncontroverted," and thus, determined that it was true. 
(R., p.148.) However, the court did not distinguish whether its findings applied to a Fifth or 
Sixth Amendment violation and additionally, instead of analyzing the presence of counsel issue 
under either claim, the district court erroneously found that no prejudice inured to Mr. Hughes 
and thus, provided no further analysis of the deficient performance claim. (R., pp. 148-154.) 
In addition to showing deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687, a petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must also demonstrate that defense 
counsel's deficiency resulted in prejudice. Id. The prejudice prong of the test is established if 
there is a reasonable probability that, "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Id. In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme 
Court found that the prejudice prong was met, where: 
The sentencing judge's specific, repeated references to the psychosexual 
evaluation suggest that it did play an important role in the sentencing. While we 
do not pass judgment in any way on whether the sentence actually imposed on 
Estrada was unreasonable or excessive, nevertheless, Estrada has met his burden 
of showing that the evaluation played a role in his sentence. Therefore, Estrada 
has demonstrated prejudice as a result of his attorney's failure to advise him of his 
Fifth Amendment rights. 
Id. at 565, 149 P.3d at 840. Thus, Estrada was not required to show that a different sentence 
would have been imposed, only that the evaluation played a role in the sentence. Here, the 
prejudice suffered by Mr. Hughes was twofold: he was forced to participate in the psychosexual 
Mr. Hughes asserts that because he had a Sixth Amendment right to the presence of 
counsel during the psychosexual evaluation, and such counsel was not present, the presence of 
counsel was denied altogether at a critical stage, thus justifying a presumption of prejudice. 
The presumption of prejudice in these contexts is justified because the failure to have 
counsel at a critical stage renders the proceeding unfair. Id. Additionally, "if counsel entirely 
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a 
denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively 
unreliable." Id. Further, "the Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any 
showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent or prevented from assisting the 
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." Id. 
A presumption of prejudice is also warranted because it is "not mandatory for the 
sentencing court to set forth reasons for the imposition of a particular sentence." State v. 
Martinsen, 128 Idaho 472,475, 915 P.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, a defendant has no way 
of knowing whether or to what extent, the district court considered any improperly obtained 
evidence. Even where the court does articulate the reasons for a sentence, there is no way to 
know if those reasons are illustrative, comprehensive, or simply those that the court relied upon 
most. This results in a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment with no possible 
remedy. 
Finally, the reason for applying a presumption of prejudice is to avoid exactly the 
scenario that arose in this case - a game of semantics in deciding that while the 
unconstitutionally obtained psychosexual evaluation played "some" role at sentencing, it did not 
play an "important" role at sentencing, because in comparing this case with Estrada, the district 
court in Mr. Hughes' case referenced and quoted from the unconstitutionally obtained 
found that clearly the psychosexual evaluation played some role in sentencing, because the 
sentencing court referenced the evaluation on two occasions in imposing sentence, but concluded 
that based on information not derived from the evaluation, the information from the 
psychosexual evaluation it did not have a sufficiently negative impact on the sentence imposed to 
justify a finding of prejudice. (R., pp.151-154.) 
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, after Mr. Hughes had indicated to the district 
court that he would like to obtain a second psychosexual evaluation at his own expense, the State 
objected, arguing that the current evaluation was very thorough and "sets forth a number of 
factors that are negative to the defendant but that doesn't entitle him to go picking and choosing 
who he gets to go see for an evaluation." (Tr. 30823, p.5, Ls.17-21.) Then, during its sentencing 
argument, the State argued that the community needed to be protected from Mr. Hughes, "who's 
a career sex offender who cannot and will not be treated." (Tr. 30823, 3/26/04, p.13, Ls.24-25.) 
The prosecutor further classified Mr. Hughes as maintaining "a successful career of remaining 
below the legal radar as he has manipulated and abused a number of girls." (Tr. 30823, p.14, 
Ls.6-8.) The State next referenced Mr. Hughes "most recent evaluation," arguing that it 
"concludes that he is not amenable to outpatient treatment. He is not rehabi!itatable [sic] at this 
time. He is a huge risk to society." (Tr. 30823, p.21, Ls.21-24.) Thus, the State's argument for 
the imposition of incarceration, rather than probation, was based, in part, on the negative 
information in the psychosexual evaluation. 
As the post conviction court recognized, the sentencing court referenced Mr. Hughes' 
psychosexual evaluation on two occasions in rendering the sentence. First, the sentencing court 
stated: 
According to the evaluation performed by Mr. McCarroll, he diagnoses 
you as having an adult antisocial personality disorder. What adult antisocial 
opposite - that Mr. Hughes did not take personal responsibility for the sexual relationship. (PSI, 
p.31.) Thus, for the post conviction court to conclude that the psychosexual evaluation, as it 
related to remorse, "had no effect" when the district court considered the sentence to impose, 
was erroneous. 
Additionally, what the post conviction court failed to recognize in denying Mr. Hughes' 
claim, is that there was other detrimental information, contained only within the psychosexual 
evaluation, which was before the sentencing court and considered by the district court when 
deciding what sentence to impose. The sentencing court read Mr. Hughes' psychosexual 
evaluation in detail, as the sentencing court did reference it on two occasions. (Tr. 30823, p.39, 
Ls.10-20, p.43, L.15-p.44, L.l, p.45, Ls.12-20.) What we do not specifically know, is the extent 
to which the other detrimental information, which could only be derived from the psychosexual 
evaluation, was considered by the sentencing court imposing the twenty-five to life aggregate 
sentence upon the 57 year old defendant. 
At two points in the sentencing hearing, the sentencing court referenced Mr. Hughes' 
alleged previous criminal conduct, upon which he had never been convicted. Early in rendering 
its decision, the sentencing court observed: 
First, the first factor I am to consider is whether the defendant's criminal conduct 
neither caused nor threatened harm. In this case I expressly find as a matter of 
fact that this criminal defendant's behavior did pose and threaten harm and in fact 
result in harm both to the victim in this case and the victims in other cases before 
him. 
(Tr. 30823, p.38, Ls.18-24.) This information came primarily from the psychosexual evaluation, 
not the PSI. The PSI mentions one other alleged victim from 1974, K.C., although there were no 
criminal charges filed. (PSI, p.9.) The PSI also references one other self-disclosed investigation 
for abuse stemming from a daycare Mr. Hughes ran with his then-wife. (R., p.9.) In contrast, 
he did not sexually abuse any other children other than [P.M.). However, he 
responded deceptively to any more under age victims. 
(PSI, p.31.) Then, in determining that Mr. Hughes did not meet any of the requirements for 
outpatient treatment, the psychosexual evaluator used Mr. Hughes lack of "willingness to be 
honest on his polygraph" and reluctance to take the polygraph without speaking to his attorney. 
(PSI, p.31.) Thus, the polygraph was a significant factor for at least two issues in the 
psychosexual evaluation, allegations of prior misconduct and Mr. Hughes' amenability to 
outpatient treatment. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the sentencing court did not consider 
the psychosexual evaluation, including the polygraph result, in imposing sentence, especially 
considering its repeated references to Mr. Hughes alleged prior misconduct with younger victims 
than P.M. Therefore, in determining whether to place Mr. Hughes on probation or incarcerate 
him, the evaluation played some role. 
Additionally, it is the evaluation that places Mr. Hughes in either the "low/moderate" or 
"moderate" category as his risk level for reoffense. (PSI, p.28.) It is the evaluation, not the PSI, 
that lists only one positive factor, comprising one sentence, "that he was sorry," and five 
negative factors that take a full page to detail. (PSI, pp.30-31.) Moreover, Mr. Hughes' criminal 
history didn't establish that he was a "career sex offender,'' as argued by the State, when such 
criminal history consisted of two (2) misdemeanor DUI's one (1) petit theft, and a dismissed 
charge of a sexual crime against a child. (PSI, p.5.) 
There may well have been additional, untainted evidence which might have justified the 
sentence imposed; indeed, the post conviction court so found. (R., pp.150-154.) For example, 
the facts of the crimes to which Mr. Hughes pied guilty may have justified the sentence imposed. 
Regardless, so long as the district court relied on unconstitutionally-obtained evidence in 
II. 
The District Court Incorrectly Analyzed Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney Rendered 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When Counsel Failed To Move To Suppress The 
Psychosexual Evaluation Because The Polygraph Results Were Obtained In Violation Of His 
Fifth Amendment Right To The Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hughes asserts that the district court erroneously analyzed this claim because, despite 
finding that Mr. Hughes was entitled to Fifth Amendment protections during the psychosexual 
evaluation, which included the polygraph, the district court incorrectly determined that 
Mr. Hughes did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the lack of counsel and thus, did not 
address Mr. Hughes' specific claim that the psychosexual evaluation should have been 
suppressed because it relied on the polygraph, which was obtained in violation of his Fif1h 
Amendment right to the presence of counsel. 
B. The District Court Incorrectly Analyzed Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney Rendered 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When Counsel Failed To Move To Suppress The 
Psychosexual Evaluation Because The Polygraph Results Were Obtained In Violation Of 
His Fifth Amendment Right To The Assistance Of Counsel 
In his petition, Mr. Hughes alleged that his attorney was ineffective for not being present 
during the polygraph, which violated his right against self-incrimination and was used to predict 
future dangerousness, and, therefore, violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
(R., pp.8-9, 18-20). He further alleged that "[his] attorney never objected at sentence. The 
polygraph should have been suppressed in court." (R., p.15.) 
When I was asked to take a polygraph, I told the police officer I did not want to 
take it, at least not without a lawyer present. The officers continued to badger me 
until I succumbed and took the test without an attorney present. Questioning in 
the polygraph concerned incidents which had occurred thirty years ago rather than 
the crime of which I was accused. At the sentencing hearing, the results of the 
polygraph were among the things used to predict my future dangerousness, which 
was in tum a significant factor in the heavy sentence which I received. My 
attorney did not challenge the use of the polygraph. 
(R., pp.116-117.) Mr. Hughes' statement is further supported by the psychosexual evaluation 
("Note-prior to participating in his polygraph on 2/11/04, Derrick stated he did not want to take 
the scheduled polygraph ... ") (Psychosexual evaluation, p.10.) He further clarified that the 
information was erroneously used to enhance his sentence. (R., p.33.) The State's response was 
as follows: 
Petitioner did not take a 'pretrial pollygraph.' A polygraph was part of his 
psychosexual evaluation, and was performed to determine if he was truthful in his 
disclosures. Exhibit 4 demonstrates that petitioner was advised of his rights and 
he waived his rights after indicating he understood them. Petitioner does not 
indicate in his allegation that he asked for counsel, or was refused the right to 
counsel, or even chose to not have counsel during the polygraph; he merely states 
there was no counsel present during the polygraph. 
(R., p.68 (errors in original).) The State simply disregards Mr. Hughes' assertions that he 
requested counsel, arguing, "Petitioner does not indicate in his allegation that he asked for 
counsel, or was refused the right to counsel, or even chose to not have counsel during the 
polygraph." (R., p.63.) Additionally, the State never addressed the claim under the Fifth 
Amendment - that if Mr. Hughes factual allegations were taken as true, he had invoked his right 
to counsel and any further questioning was done in violation of his Fifth Amendment right. 
Importantly, the State never provided any evidence on the substance of the "warnings" that 
Mr. Hughes allegedly received. As such, there was a material issue of genuine fact regarding 
whether Mr. Hughes did, in fact, invoke his right to counsel, and if so, did that occur before or 
after the "warnings." 
the examiner. This latter examination clearly implicated his Fifth Amendment rights." 
(R., p.150.) 
Moreover, because Mr. Hughes requested counsel during a custodial interrogation, and 
that request for counsel was not honored, had a motion to suppress been filed, Mr. Hughes would 
likely have prevailed upon the motion. 
C. Because Mr. Hughes Was Subjected To A Custodial Interrogation After He Requested 
Counsel, There Were Likely Grounds Upon Which To Suppress The Polygraph 
Examination 
In order to show his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file 
a motion to suppress, the appellate courts examine "the probability of success of such a motion." 
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 976 P.2d 927 (] 999). It is apparent that Mr. Hughes' trial 
counsel never objected to, or moved to suppress the results of the polygraph test, which was 
given despite Mr. Hughes' requests to speak with his attorney (Tr. 30823, pp.3 - 48), and that 
counsel had notice of that error through, at a minimum, the comment in the psychosexual 
evaluation. (PSI, p.31.) Because Mr. Hughes was questioned, despite his request to speak with 
his attorney and have his attorney be present during the polygraph, his trial counsel was deficient 
for failing to object or move to suppress the results of the polygraph examination. See Arizona v. 
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677 (1988) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981) 
(holding that "a suspect who has 'expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities unless the accused himself 
initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police."')). 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a defendant 
has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST amend. V. "The Fifth 
Amendment privilege is 'as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard ... "' Estelle v. 
standard and the request must be clear and unequivocal and may not be ambiguous. Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (suspect's statement that "maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer" was not an assertion of the right to counsel); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d 
31, 36 (2001). 
Mr. Hughes did request counsel prior to participating in the polygraph. (R., pp.8-9, 15.) 
While the State moved for summary dismissal, 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised 
no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would 
entitle the applicant to the relief requested. A material fact has "some logical 
connection with the consequential facts [,]" Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th 
Ed.1999), and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal theories 
presented by the parties. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 
1163 (Ct.App.1991). However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even 
where the State does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is 
not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App.1994). 
State v. Yakovac, 180 P.3d 476,483 (Ct. App. 2008.) 
I. Mr. Hughes Was In Custody For Purposes Of The Polygraph Examination 
During the time of the polygraph, Mr. Hughes was housed in the county jail prior to, and 
after, the polygraph. (R., 30823, pp. 39-44; 48-49; (Tr. 3/26/2004, p. 7, Ls. 2-3 ("One of the 
problems is that Mr. Hughes has been incarcerated for a substantial period of time.") 
(Psychosexual evaluation, p.l, "Derrick has been incarcerated at the Twin Falls County Jail since 
2003") (Polygraph Report, p.l, "Derrick first told me he is presently in jail awaiting 
sentencing.")). Thus, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, Mr. Hughes was in custody during 
the polygraph. See also State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 44 P.3d 1193 (Ct. App. 2002) 
Additionally, after Mr. Hughes "indicated deception," there was a follow-up interrogation 
to "provide clarification or new disclosures." (PSI, p.33.) The polygraph was done as part of the 
psychosexual evaluation (PSI, p.27), and had Mr. Hughes disclosed any yet-uncharged 
misconduct, that evidence would have been turned over to the State, as the psychosexual 
evaluation was provided to pre-sentence investigator, the State and the Court. (R., 30823, p.5.) 
Moreover, the psychosexual evaluator would have had a statutory obligation to tum over that 
information and if he didn't, the PSI investigator certainly would have. (See Idaho Code § 16-
1619, requiring "(a]ny physician, resident on a hospital staff, intern, nurse, coroner, school 
teacher, day care personnel, social worker, or other person having reason to believe that a child 
under the age of eighteen ( 18) years has been abused," must report that abuse or face 
misdemeanor charges). Accordingly, Mr. Hughes was subjected to an interrogation. 
3. The Psychosexual Evaluator And Therefore, The Polygraph Examiner, Were 
State Actors For Purposes Of The Fifth Amendment 
The final element to determine whether Mr. Hughes was entitled to Fifth Amendment 
protections during the polygraph depends on whether the person conducting the interrogation 
was a state actor. State v. Heritage, 95 P.3d 345,349 (Wash. 2004) (citing State v. Sargent, 762 
P.Zd 1127 (1988). 
The district court ordered a psychosexual evaluation, "In this matter I believe it is also 
necessary and appropriate for me to enter an order for the preparation of a psychosexual 
evaluation by a qualified ATSA approved provider." (Tr., November 21, 2003, p.31, Ls.11-14.) 
In this case, the psychosexual evaluation was conducted by Mark Annas, a Clinical Consultant 
with McNeil and Associates. (Psychosexual Eval, p.1.) Mr. Annas, in turn, selected William 
Walter to conduct the polygraph. (PSI, p.27.) Thus, the polygrapher was a person designated by 
suppression because it was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 
Because the State erroneously analyzed this issue (R., pp.72-73) and the court granted the State's 
Motion to Dismiss in its entirety (R., p.133), there is a strong probability a motion to suppress 
would have been successful. However, because the resolution of this issue is necessarily 
predicated on factual findings regarding the invocation and possible waiver, this issue must be 
remanded to the district court for appropriate factual findings. 
D. Mr. Hughes Has Also Established The Prejudice Prong For A Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel 
The prejudice suffered by Mr. Hughes was twofold: he was forced to participate in the 
psychosexual evaluation when he was not required to and the evaluation resulted in prejudicial 
information which was used to justify the imposition of a more harsh sentence than he would 
have otherwise received. The post conviction court found that, 
Judge Hohnhorst had reviewed both [the psychosexual evaluation and the 
presentence investigation report.] The PSI investigator relied upon the 
psychosexual evaluation in making her recommendation that Hughes be 
sentenced to a period of incarceration ... She stated that 'He is not amenable for 
treatment, according to his evaluation, and therefore would continue to present a 
risk to the community.' This conclusion mirrored that of the evaluation report: 
'Derrick Hughes does not meet any of the requirements for out patient treatment 
(personal responsibility, empathy, willingness to be honest on his polygraph) and 
is not amenable to out-patient treatment. 
(R., p.151.) 
Additionally, the psychosexual evaluator relied upon the polygraph to determine 
Mr. Hughes future dangerousness. (PSI, pp.22-31.) When Mr. Annas commented on 
Mr. Hughes lack of amenability to treatment and his future dangerousness, "his role changed and 
became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a 
post arrest custodial setting." Id. Thus, because the psychosexual was so tainted by the 
B. The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney Rendered 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When He Failed To Insure That Mr. Hughes Was 
Provided Miranda Warnings Prior To The Commencement Of The Presentence 
Investigation Report 
The district court dismissed Mr. Hughes' claim that "counsel did not make sure defendant 
had his Miranda rights read to him prior to his PSI investigation." (R., p.143.) The court 
characterizes this claim as a failure to "warn him of the more general privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment in post plea proceedings and that therefore his Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated." (R., p.143.) The post conviction court, while noting that the 
Fifth Amendment applies to pre-sentence investigation reports, found that pursuant to Stuart v. 
State, 144 Idaho 467, 180 P.2d 506 (2008), because the presentence investigation did not 
constitute a critical stage, even if trial counsel did fail to advise Mr. Hughes about his Fifth 
Amendment rights, it would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., p.144.) The 
post conviction court alternatively found that Mr. Hughes waived his Fifth Amendment 
protections. (R., p.144.) These findings were erroneous. 
Mr. Hughes asserts that because he was entitled to generalized warnings regarding his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and because the holding in Stuart is incorrect, 
this Court hold that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to 
properly advise Mr. Hughes of his rights prior to the PSI. Additionally, because Mr. Hughes can 
demonstrate prejudice suffered as a result of the deficient performance, this Court should find his 
attorney provided ineffective assistance. 
recognized exceptions. Id. at 143-144, 44 P.3d at 1198-1199. The court found that although 
Mr. Curless was in custody for purposes of a Fifth Amendment analysis, he was not subjected to 
an interrogation because, "the questioning did not take place in a police station and was not 
conducted by police personnel. Rather, the evaluator who did the questioning in this case was a 
neutral party appointed by the district court pursuant to LC.§ 18-8316." Id, at 144, 44 P.3d at 
1199. The court did find, however, that "presentence investigations are usually conducted by 
state agents." Id. at 145, 44 P.3d at 1200. The court also found that Mr. Curless was not 
threatened with a penalty if he failed to participate in the evaluation and thus, the second 
exception did not apply. Id. The remaining holding in Curless, that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel does not apply to psychosexual evaluations was overruled by Estrada v. State, 143 
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007). Thus, one of the factors the Curless court relied on was the 
status of the individual providing the evaluation. As noted below, Mr. Hughes asserts that the 
individual performing the presentence investigation report is not a neutral party, but rather, is an 
individual with an adversarial role, similar to law enforcement. 
2. Stuart v. State Should Be Overruled Because It Erroneously Decided There Was 
Not A Sixth Amendment Right To The Assistance Of Counsel In A Presentence 
Interview 
The issue in Stuart was whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Stuart's post 
conviction claim that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel 
failed to consult with him regarding the presentence investigation report. Id. at 468, 180 P .3d at 
507. The Stuart Opinion erroneously concluded that the PSI was not a critical stage, and thus, 
Mr. Stuart had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel such that trial counsel could not have 
rendered ineffective assistance. Id. at 145 Idaho 471, 180 P.3d at 510. Estrada held there was a 
Sixth Amendment right "up through conviction or entry of a guilty plea, and would also be 
"possibility of prejudice to the defendant's interests." Stuart, 145 Idaho at 470, 180 P.3d at 509. 
The concurrence opines that the majority's decision characterized PSI's as "routine" when they 
"[delve] into information that for the most part is available in public records." Id. at 471, 180 
P.3d at 510. No such PSI exists in Idaho, as all PSI's include information that is in-depth and 
personal and is potentially violative of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, which is 
certainly "possibly prejudicial to the defendant's interests." 
a. The Stuart Opinion Is In Error In That The Decision Holds That The 
Presentence Information Gathering Process Is Not A Critical Stage Of The 
Prosecution 
The Stuart Opinion relies primarily on three grounds to conclude that the information 
gathering process of the presentence investigation is not a critical stage. The first is that, 
"Although the [Idaho Supreme] Court was not directly addressing the issue, the [Idaho Supreme] 
Court appears to have indicated that a 'routine' presentence investigation is not a critical stage." 
Id. at 470, 180 P.3d at 509. Second, the Stuart Court relied on distinguishable federal and state 
cases which held that the presentence investigation is not a critical stage. Third, the court noted 
that Mr. Stuart "has not distinguished his presentence investigation from any other routine 
presentence investigation." Id. Thereafter, the Stuart Court held that, "Stuart's routine 
presentence interview was not a critical stage of the adversarial proceedings." Id. at 471, 180 
P.3d at 510. 
1. Definition Of A Critical Stage 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that a Sixth Amendment right exists in the 
interim period between the finding of guilt and the sentencing hearing. In Estrada v. State, 143 
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). The Court stated: 
preparation (are) vitally important, the defendants ... (are) as much entitled to such aid (of 
counsel) during that period as the trial itself." Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 
(1964) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932)). Put another way, critical stages are 
those "pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to 
proceed without counsel." Gertstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975). 
ii. The Defendant Has A Due Process Right In The Preparation Of 
Sentencing 
Just as a defendant has a due process right in the trial, so too, does a defendant have a due 
process right in the sentencing procedure; "[t]he sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, 
must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause." Garner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,358 
(1977). One of the reasons is that: 
to the extent such recommendations are influential in determining the resulting 
sentence, the necessity for aid of counsel in marshalling the facts, introducing 
evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the 
defendant to present his case as to sentence is apparent. Even more important in a 
case such as this is the fact that certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at 
this stage. 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). This is because, "the defendant has a legitimate 
interest in the character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he 
may have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process." Garner, 430 U.S. at 
358. 
(a.) The Defendant Has The Same Rights During The 
Presentence Investigation Process As Those Protected At 
Sentencing 
If the pretrial procedures are protected by the Sixth Amendment to insure the Due 
Process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are met, (Powell, 287 U.S. at 69-
71,) then, concomitantly, to afford due process protection in the sentencing proceeding, the Sixth 
psychiatric examination of the defendant, despite the fact that neither party requested it. Id. The 
doctor interviewed the defendant for about 90 minutes and provided a letter to the court 
regarding the defendant's competency. Id. At sentencing, over objection from the defense, this 
doctor was allowed to testify as to the defendant's future dangerousness, one of the elements the 
State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a valid death sentence. Id. at 
457-458. 
In analyzing whether the defendant had the right to effective assistance of counsel 
pursuant to the 6th Amendment, the United States Supreme Court found that the doctor's 
conclusion regarding the defendant's future dangerousness was drawn "largely from 
respondent's account of the crime during their interview, and he placed particular emphasis on 
what he considered to be respondent's lack of remorse." Id. at 464. And, 
That respondent was questioned by a psychiatrist designated by the trial court to 
conduct a neutral competency examination, rather than by a police officer, 
government informant, or prosecuting attorney is immaterial. ... During the 
psychiatric evaluation, respondent assuredly was "faced with a phase of the 
adversary system" and was "not in the presence of [a) perso[n) acting solely in his 
interest." 
Id. at 467. Ultimately, in determining that a Sixth Amendment right existed, the Court held: 
Since [1932), we have held that the right to counsel granted by the Sixth 
Amendment means that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer "at or after the 
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him ... 
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, 
or arraignment." 
Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 226-227.) The Court further explained: 
It is central to [the Sixth Amendment] principle that in addition to counsel's 
presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that the need not stand alone against 
the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where 
counsel's absence might derogate from the acused's right to a fair trial. 
Id. at 469-470 (footnote omitted in original) (emphasis added). 
(b.) In Idaho, The Preparation Of The PSI Is A Critical Stage 
The completion of Presentence Investigation Reports is governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 
32. Rule 32 does not require the defendant's participation. See I.C.R. 32, and Estrada, 143 
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). As noted by the American Probation and Parole Association: 
The primary purpose of the pre-sentence report is to provide the sentencing court 
with succinct and precise information upon which to base a rational sentencing 
decision. Potential use of the report by other agencies in the correctional process 
should be recognized as a factor in determining the content and length of the 
report but should be subordinated to its primary purpose. 
American Probation and Parole Association. 8 In State v. Cornwall, 95 Idaho 680, 5.18 
P.2d 863 (1974), the Idaho Supreme Court noted: 
To begin a discussion of the requirements of a presentence report's 
recommendation for rehabilitation, the purpose of the presentence report must be 
defined. One of the best definitions is that, 
'No single instrument in our hands so neatly typifies the modern correctional 
philosophy as does the presentence report. Its only reason for being is to depict 
the intimate dynamics of one particular individual offender and to enable the court 
to dispose of his case with a tailor-made plan that is corrective in intent, whereas 
without such knowledge the disposition can only be punitive.' 
Id. at 686, 518 P .2d at 869 (internal citation omitted). 
In Idaho, Presentence Investigation Reports are exclusively completed by probation 
officers, who are employees of the Department of Corrections, which is part of law enforcement 
in the Executive Branch.9 The purpose of the PSI is to assist the court in sentencing, the primary 
goal of which is protection of society. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 495, 129 P.3d 1241, 
1244 (2006). 
8 www.appa-net.org, last visited on November 11, 2008. 
9http://corrections.state.id.us/about_us/overview.htm;http://www.state.id.us/govemment/ 
executive.html, last visited on November 11, 2008. 
a individual had a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation. 
(Estrada, p.5.) In particular, the court noted: 
The presentence report relies greatly on information already available in public 
records, such as educational background, residence history, and employment 
information. In contrast, a psychosexual evaluation like the one Estrada faced is 
more in-depth and personal, and includes an inquiry into the defendant's sexual 
history, with verification by polygraph being highly recommended. Because of 
the nature of the information sought, a defendant is more likely to make 
incriminating statements during a psychosexual evaluation than during a routine 
presentence investigation. As the district court in this case concluded, 'the 
psychosexual evaluation contained information concerning Estrada's future 
dangerousness.' 
143 Idaho at 526, 149 P.3d at 837 (internal citation omitted). 
Thus, what the Estrada Court held was that a psychosexual evaluation was potentially 
more violative of an individual's Fifth Amendment right than a presentence investigation; there 
was no determination made as to whether the presentence investigation was also potentially 
violative of the Fifth Amendment right. 
The Estrada Court, in making this determination focused on the nature of the information 
being gathered, distinguishing between information "already available in public records" and 
"more in-depth and personal information." Id. Notably, if the information is already public 
information, there is no need for the defendant to provide this information. This is consistent 
with the language of Idaho Criminal Rule 32, which does not mandate cooperation by the 
defendant • such cooperation is apparently unnecessary if such information can be gathered 
independently or is otherwise available as public information. In contrast, information that was 
"in-depth and personal" and, therefore, could only be obtained from the individual, would be 
more likely to implicate the Fifth Amendment rights during the information gathering process of 
the psychosexual evaluation. The Estrada Court's focus, then, in determining whether the 
psychosexual evaluation constituted a critical stage, was to protect the defendant from disclosing 
Id. Herein lies the problem with concluding that Idaho's PSI's are "routine," but not analyzing 
whether the information gathered pursuant to ICR 32 is in-depth and personal. Since 1979, when 
ICR 32 was created, the development of caselaw and federal and state law has rendered much of 
LC.R. 32 information "in-depth and personal" rather than "public," thus precluding its definition 
as "routine." For example, under ICR 32(b )(1 ), the defendant can only be compelled to provide 
information regarding "the defendant's version of events" that mirrors the charging language to 
which he pied guilty, i.e., information that could be inquired into at the time of the guilty plea to 
insure a valid guilty plea. State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 215, 868 P.2d at 1234. Attempting to 
elicit more information than essentially a reiteration of the charging document language could 
amount to compelling the client to "testify[ ] to matters that went well beyond the facts of the 
case," and would be a violation of the client's Fifth Amendment right. Id. at 218. This fact was 
recognized by the sentencing court in the case at bar, when Mr. Hughes wished to "address the 
court as to his reasons for pleading guilty in this case (Tr. 30823, 11/21/2003, p.5, L.24-p.4, L. l), 
the district court responded by explaining what he would permit Mr. Hughes to do, stating, "But, 
it would not be my intention to ask him to elaborate on whether or not the facts as stated here -
ask him to State the facts beyond agreeing or disagreeing that the statements contained in the 
Indictment are accurate." (Tr. 30823, 11/21/2003, p.7, Ls.5-9.) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(b)(4) requires the inclusion of the educational background of the 
client. The Estrada Court also characterized this information as public information. Id. at 5. In 
fact, educational background and history is not public information. 
The Federal Education Records and Privacy Act (FERPA), commonly known as 
the Buckley Amendment, requires that any school or institution that receives 
federal funds for education may not release school records or any other personally 
identifiable information without the prior consent of the student, with a few 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (hereinafter, HIP AA), which precludes the 
disclosure, with exceptions of"individual indentifiable health infonnation:" 
The Privacy Rule protects all "individually identifiable health infonnation" held 
or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associate, in any fonn or media, 
whether electronic, paper or oral. The Privacy Rule calls this infonnation 
"protected health information" (PHI). Individually indentifiable health 
information is information, including demographic data, that relates to: 
The individuals past, present or future physical or mental health or condition; 
The provision of healthcare to the individual; 
The past present or future payment for provision of health service to the 
individual; 
and that identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe 
can be used to identify the individual. Individually identifiable health information 
includes many common identifiers ( eg. name, address, birthdate, Social Security 
Number.) 
Sununary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, OCR Privacy Brief, Department of Health and Human 
Services, last revised May, 2003. 10 
Financial information is also not public information and can be released only through 
court order for specific purposes. (See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et. seq.) Additionally: 
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 protects the confidentiality of 
personal financial records by creating a statutory Fourth Amendment protection 
for bank records. The Act was essentially a reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's 
1976 ruling in United States v. Miller, where the Court found that bank customers 
had no legal right to privacy in financial infonnation held by financial institutions. 
425 U.S. 435 (1976). Generally, the RFPA requires that federal government 
agencies provide individuals with a notice and an opportunity to object before a 
bank or other specified institution can disclose personal financial information to a 
federal government agency, often for law enforcement purposes .... 
The RFP A sates that "no Government authority may have access to or obtain 
copies of, or the information contained in the financial records of any customer 
from a financial institution unless the financial records are reasonably described" 
and 
circumstance in which the Fifth Amendment applies. Having the advice of counsel during the 
information gathering process of the presentence investigation could avoid some of that 
prejudice. 
At either the entry of the guilty plea or the finding of guilt, the defendant is given a PSI 
questiormaire that requires the defendant to provide information regarding the categories as set 
forth in I.C.R. 32. I.C.R. 32. The PSI can also include various evaluations. I.C.R. 32. 
Following the completion of the PSI questiormaire, the defendant has a face-to-face 
interview with the investigator, at which time the TCU instrument and the LSI-R assessment tool 
are given to the defendant. The TCU instrument measures substance abuse and the LSI-R 
assesses what types of programming are relevant in the correctional setting. (Idaho Department 
of Correction Operations Programs Division (hereinafter, IDOC Operations), 2006.)11 While the 
PSI in Mr. Hughes' case was done before the adoption of the LSI-Rand the TCU, nevertheless, 
other testing was done as part of the psychosexual evaluation, such as the Static 99, Prasor, SVR 
20, Mental Status Examination, Personality Assessment Inventory and the polygraph. 
(Psychosexual evaluation, p.2.) Thereafter, the investigator will take the questiormaire, confirm 
or verify as much of the information as possible, request additional clarification or information 
from the defendant. (IDOC Operations, p.10.) Notably, "The investigation includes an interview 
that includes personal, criminal, demographic and family information for the sentencing court. 
This information provides in-depth and insightful offender information for the presiding court." 
(IDOC Operations, p. l 0, emphasis added). 
Thus, the PSI is comprised of information which does not require the defendant to engage 
in in-depth and personal self disclosure, which can also be public information, and information 
11 ,....., 
reasons for providing Sixth Amendment protections. Because, "incrimination is implicated not 
just when additional charges could be filed, but also when punishment could be enh.:inced as a 
result of the defendant's statements," the client is entitled to the protection of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. Estrada, 143 Idaho 564, 149 P .3d at 839 ( citing Pens v. Bail, 902 
F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
Because of the Fifth Amendment implications, the PSI information gathering process is a 
"particular confrontation" in which there is a "potential substantial prejudice to the defendant's 
rights" and "the ability of counsel [can] help avoid that prejudice." Estrada, 143 Idaho 562, 149 
P.3d at 837 (citing Wade, 338 U.S. at 227). As such, when the Stuart court concluded that the 
information gathering process of the presentence investigation process was not a critical stage of 
the prosecution for which defendants are entitled to counsel, it did so in violation of controlling 
state and federal law, and as such, was erroneous and this Court should overrule that case. 
c. The Stuart Opinion Erroneously Relied On Distinguishable Federal And 
State Cases Which Held That The Presentence Investigation Stage Of The 
Prosecution Is Not A Critical Stage 
In the Opinion, the Court states, "The majority of other courts to directly address this 
issue agree with the indication in Estrada. Several federal courts have held that a routine 
presentence investigation is not a critical stage of the proceedings in a non-capital 
case .... Furthermore, many state courts have likewise concluded that a non-capital presentence 
investigation is not a critical stage." (Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467, 470, 180 P.3d 506, 509 
(2008) (internal citations omitted)). While correct, the cases cited have been superceded by 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b )(2). Additionally, more recent state court decisions 
indicate that the trend is to treat the presentence interview as a critical stage of the proceedings. 
the defendant to provide information which will be used in preparation of 
the presentence investigation. This procedure, which generally mirrors the 
approach in the Model Local Rule for Guideline Sentencing, supra, is intended to 
maximize judicial economy by providing for more orderly sentencing hearings 
while also providing fair opportunity for both parties to review, object to, and 
comment upon, the probation officer's report in advance of the sentencing 
hearing. 
(emphasis added). The Committee further found that even with the amendment, "the parties 
would still be free at the sentencing hearing to comment on the presentence report, and in the 
discretion of the court, to introduce evidence concerning their objections to the report." (Id.) 
Thus, to rely on the federal cases to say there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
disregards the practical reality that federal defendant's have a right, albeit by rule, to have their 
counsel's advice and presence, during the information gathering process of the presentence 
report. Additionally, the precedent relied on by the Stuart Court is unlikely to be overruled when 
it no longer has any force given F.R.Cr.P. 32. The comments to the rules also implicitly 
recognize the potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights in the form of Fifth 
Amendment violations in that it allows objections to be made during the information gathering 
process of the presentence report, supporting the assertion of the Fifth Amendment prior to 
making the incriminating statements. 
Additionally, the federal cases that don't find a Sixth Amendment right generally don't 
have support in the Supreme Court cases upon which they rely. 
ii. The Federal Cases Rely On The Distinction Of The Probation 
Officer's Role As An Extension Of The Court And Not An Agent 
Of The Government Which Is Not Supported By The United States 
Supreme Court Cases 
Although the Ninth Circuit has held that, "it is now the law of this circuit that the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments apply to a presentence interview in preparation for a capital sentencing 
the individual has an adversarial role, such as law enforcement, that weighs in favor of finding a 
Sixth Amendment right in the presentence process. 
However, this distinction is not the basis in any of the United States Supreme Court cases 
defining critical stages for purposes of a Sixth Amendment analysis. Instead, the Court focuses 
on the need to protect the rights of the defendant against unfairness and prejudice. As noted 
above, in Wade, supra, the Court explained: 
It is central to [the Sixth Amendment] principle that in addition to counsel's 
presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that the need not stand alone against 
the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where 
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. 
Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-227; See also, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964), 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932), Gertstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975) and 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981 ). Additionally, State courts have begun to recognize Sixth 
Amendment rights during the information gathering process of the PSI. 
iii. Recently, State Courts Have Recognized And Provided Sixth 
Amendment Protections During The Information Gathering 
Process Of The PSI 
The Idaho Supreme Court found a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
applied to psychosexual evaluations prepared as part of a PSI because of the nature of the in-
depth and personal information gathered. Estrada, supra. The Supreme Court additionally 
found a Sixth Amendment right to counsel as part of that evaluation, holding that, "It makes no 
sense that a defendant would be entitled to counsel up through conviction or entry of a guilty 
plea, and would also be entitled to representation at sentencing, yet would not be entitled to the 
advice of counsel in the interim period regarding a psychosexual evaluation." Estrada, 143 
Idaho 562, 149 P.3d at 837. It also makes no sense that one has a Sixth Amendment right during 
revocation as well as all post-indictment out-of-court critical stages where, without the assistance 
of counsel, the legal interests of the defendant might be prejudiced." Id. at 906. 
Thus, the court found pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, the client was entitled to the 
assistance of counsel when the district court seeks information from the defendant, whether that 
request is made in court by the judge or out of court by an agent of the court. Id. at 318 64 7 P .2d 
at 907. The Oregon court noted that the reason the defendant was entitled to the Sixth 
Amendment protection was because of the implication of the Fifth Amendment: "The decisive 
factor in any presentence setting is not the official capacity or profession of the presentence 
investigator or the setting in which the inquiry is made, but rather the willingness of the 
defendant to provide information." Id. at 907. The court then ultimately held, "With the 
assistance of counsel, a defendant can decide advisedly and voluntarily whether it is in his best 
interest to submit to interviews and examinations and, if so, whether with or without his attorney 
in attendance." Id. 
Other courts have subsequently held similarly. See State v. Cox, 519 A.2d 1144 (Vt. 
1987) (where the defendant had requested additional legal advice prior to participating in the PSI 
and the probation officer said that if he waited for counsel he would forfeit his ability to have the 
PSI, the Court held that was coercive, rendering his statements involuntary in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment); but see State v. Cyr, 726 A.2d 488 (Vt. 1999), (the record was insufficient to 
decide whether client was entitled to the assistance of counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment 
or whether he was entitled to Miranda warnings prior to participating in the PSI and that 
regardless, there was no coercion nor an assertion of his Fifth Amendment right during the 
presentence investigation). 
indigent and inept at great disadvantage." Id. at 296. The court further found that, "The 
presentence interview plays a crucial role in determining the probation officer's recommended 
sentence ... ," and that "[a]t a presentence interview, a defendant is likely to address matters that 
were not raised at trial and that will likely have a significant impact on sentence. Moreover, a 
defendant's statements during a presentence interview can even have an impact on later 
prosecutions - of both the defendant and others." Id. at 296. 
In recognizing that the majority of the federal cases hold there is no Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel at the presentence interview, the Vermont Court held that those cases were either 
unpersuasive or inapplicable because many of the federal cases relied on the nature of the 
probation officer "as an extension of the court and not an agent of the govermnent" to find the 
presentence process was not a critical stage - a distinction that was not present in the United 
States Supreme Court cases addressing the issue. Id. at 299. Instead, the Court said, the 
Supreme Court cases that determined whether a Sixth Amendment right to counsel existed 
"depend[ ] primarily on the possibility of prejudice and unfairness in the proceedings and the 
ability of the presence of counsel to protect against such prejudice and unfairness." Id. at 300. 
After reviewing several United States Supreme Court cases, the Vermont court, citing United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), clearly articulated the standard that did not rely on the 
nature of the person doing the evaluation, but rather, "a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel 
'at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence 
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. Carter, 848 A.2d at 300. 
The Court further echoed the findings of the Oregon court in Jones, supra, noting that 
simply because the PSI was done for the judge's convenience in an out-of-court forum, it was 
essentially a function of the court, and thus, the client was entitled to counsel. 176 Vt. at 348, 
convicted of the first degree murder charge and a second degree murder while armed with a 
deadly weapon charge. Id. The PSI investigator tried to get the client to talk about the offense 
but ultimately, after making some incriminating statements, the client said he wouldn't discuss it 
any more. Id. at 706. The Investigator did not attempt to detain the client or continue with the 
interview. Id. Mr. Everybodytalksabout was sentenced to the maximum term of 328 months 
with community placement for two years. Id. at 694. The case was appealed, reversed on a jury 
instruction issue and remanded to the district court. Id At the third trial, the PSI investigator 
testified regarding the statements the client made at the interview. Id. The client moved to 
suppress the testimony of the PSI investigator on the grounds of a Sixth Amendment violation. 
Id. The court denied the motion on the grounds that the PSI investigator had no reason to believe 
the client would make any incriminating statements, nor did she take any action that was 
deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement. Id. 
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals held that Mr. Everybodytalksabout's Sixth 
Amendment rights were not violated because although the PSI constituted a critical stage of the 
proceeding, because his appeal was pending, the PSI investigator did not "deliberately elicit" the 
statements. Id at 694-695. 
On review, the Washington Supreme Court articulated the issue as whether, the PSI 
constitutes a critical stage, and if so, if a government agent elicits information, were the 
statements deliberately elicited. State v. Everybodytalksabout, 166 P.3d 693 (2007). The Court 
found the presentence interview was a critical stage because not only did the state concede the 
presentence interview was critical stage, but also because "the presentence interview here was 
ultimately adversarial because although Everybodytalksabout's statements aided the court in 
Id. 
questions were more than just an effort to stimulate conversation, and they were 
clearly about the crime charged. She explicitly asked Everybodytalksabout to 
discuss the very crime for which he was charged and convicted, and the State 
subsequently used Everybodytalksabout's own words to retry him for the same 
crime. 
As a result, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' Opinion and remanded the case for a 
retrial without the statements on the grounds that the State violated the client's Sixth Amendment 
right to assistance of counsel because the presentence interview constituted a critical stage of the 
proceedings and the investigator deliberately elicited Everybodytalksabout's statements. Id. at 
698. 
While there are a few recent State court cases that hold there is no Fifth or Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, those cases are unavailing as the reasoning employed is faulty or 
incomplete. For example, in State v. Kauk, 691 N.W.2d 606 (S.D. 2005), the Court engaged in 
no analysis of the issue of whether there is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the 
presentence interview. Instead, after string citing most of the relevant federal cases, the Court 
stated, "Based upon the majority rule followed by the foregoing authorities, we hold that there 
was no denial ofKauk's right to counsel during his presentence interview." Id. at 610. The flaw 
in this case is that it does not recognize the F.R.Cr.P. 32 as superceding these federal cases, nor 
does it recognize the trend in recent caselaw on the issue. 
In State v. Sexton, 727 N. W.2d 560 (Wis. 2007), the client claimed that the court had 
violated his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to advise him of his Miranda warnings prior to 
participating in what the client called an "accusatorial" presentence interview. Id. at 564. The 
client also claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because he was 
unable to consult with his attorney regarding the use of a prior PSI during the presentence 
interview in the new case. Id. at 565. 
rights. It also fails to recognize that one of the purposes of the Sixth Amendment right is to 
protect against Fifth Amendment violations. The right to refuse to engage in any self-disclosure 
or other incriminating statements prior to making the statements is the whole point of the Fifth 
Amendment protection and that right can be protected by consulting with counsel before making 
the statements. 
In State v. Johnson, 836 N.E.2d 1243 (Ohio 2005), while undergoing a drug and alcohol 
evaluation to be used by the court during sentencing in a homicide case, the juvenile confessed to 
an unrelated murder. Id. at 1246-1247. The social worker performing the drug and alcohol 
evaluator relayed that information to the client's probation officer. Id. at 1247. The probation 
officer then interviewed the client for his presentence interview and clarified with the client that 
all information would be relayed to the judge. Id. She then asked a standard question of whether 
he had ever fired a weapon, and after he responded affirmatively, she then asked, "What 
happened?" Id. The juvenile filed a motion to suppress his statements to the social worker doing 
the drug and alcohol evaluation because he was not provided Miranda warnings and also because 
of a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 1250. He also moved to suppress the 
statements to the probation officer under the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
Citing the federal cases that held that "the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation is 
not present in a prearranged, routine probation interview" (internal citations omitted), the Court 
held that the client was in custody during the interview, and although the PSI was prearranged, 
the interview was not "routine." Id. at 1257 ( emphasis in original). This PSI was not routine 
because of the information provided to the PSI investigator prior to the interview by the social 
worker - that the client had confessed to an unrelated murder. Id at 1250. The Court further 
held that because the probation officer deliberately elicited the information by asking, "What 
iv. There Is A Significant Distinction Between Federal Presentence 
Investigators And Idaho Presentence Investigators 
Even if there is no Sixth Amendment right in the federal presentence process, there is a 
Sixth Amendment right in Idaho State courts. Unlike federal presentence investigators, Idaho 
presentence investigators are members of the executive branch, not the judicial branch, and are 
not an "extension of the court," but are rather "an agent of the government." Thus, as noted in 
Leonti, supra: 
While the process is not strictly adversarial in nature, the government is not 
transformed into a neutral and impartial "arm of the court" simply because it is 
seeking information from the defendant. While seeking [the defendant's] 
assistance [by providing information], the government continues to 
simultaneously seek the imposition of a sentence for his crime, . . . In this way, a 
defendant's presentence cooperation is somewhat similar to police interrogation. 
Any speculative benefits he may receive from providing information do not 
change the essentially adversarial nature of the encounter. 
Leonti, 326 F.3d at 1119 -1120 (9th Cir. 2003). While the issue in Leonti was whether failing to 
effectively assist a defendant awaiting sentencing in his willing efforts to provide cooperation to 
an interested government can constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, the reasoning defining the 
adversarial nature of the relationship between the federal agents and the defendant during a 
cooperation agreement also applies and defines the relationship between defendants and 
presentence investigators in the State of Idaho. In Idaho, the presentence investigator is an 
employee of the Department of Corrections, who will ultimately recommend to the court whether 
the individual should be incarcerated or placed on probation. (I.C.R. 32; 
http://corrections.state.id.us/about us/overview.html). The Presentence Investigator is seeking 
the imposition of specific, recommended sentence, and, in fact, recommends whether the 
defendant should be incarcerated, given a period of retained jurisdiction, or placed on probation. 
In this setting, certainly any benefits the defendant may obtain by providing non-public 
infnrmMion does not "change the essentially adversarial nature of the encounter" and thus, 
Additionally, in Stuart, the PSI was not part of the record on appeal and thus, as noted in 
the Concurrence, mandated a finding that the missing PSI must be presumed to support the 
action of the trial court." Id. (citations omitted). Here, the inclusion of the PSI provides the 
additional information that was not present in Stuart for a finding that Stuart is inapposite to the 
case at bar. 
C. The District Court Erred In Finding That Mr. Hughes Waived His Fifth Amendment 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
The district court erred in finding that Mr. Hughes waived his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination by only determining that Mr. Hughes, "has not shown that he protested 
to participating in the PSI. He only claims that [trial counsel] did not tell him of his right against 
self-incrimination. Without a showing that he protested to participating in the PSI, Hughes 
waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." (R., p.144.) As argued in 
Section II, above, and incorporated herein by reference, Mr. Hughes fell within one of the 
recognized exceptions to invoking the Fifth Amendment right to still obtain its protections. 
Because the district court failed to determine whether Mr. Hughes fell within one of these 
exceptions, it erred in finding that Mr. Hughes waived any Fifth Amendment protections. 
D. Mr. Hughes Established Prejudice As A Result Of Participating In The PSI 
The prejudice prong is set forth in Section I above, and need not be repeated but is 
incorporated herein by reference. Additionally, because the psychosexual evaluation was 
incorporated into the PSI, it tainted the PSI. For example, the presentence investigator 
specifically referenced and attached the evaluation. (PSI, p.13.) Another problematic area was 
the Defendant's Version of the PSI. It provided far greater detail for the offense than did the 
charging document to which Mr. Hughes pied. (compare, PSI, pp.3-4 to Tr., 30834, 11/21/2003, 
The District Court Erroneously Analyzed Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney Rendered 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Obtain An Independent, Confidential 
Evaluation Such That The Evaluation Could Be Reviewed By Mr. Hughes And His Counsel 
Prior To The Release Of That Information To The District Court And The State 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hughes asserts that the district court incorrectly analyzed his claim that his attorney 
performed below a reasonable standard when he failed to get an independent, confidential 
evaluation so that he could review that document with counsel prior to that information being 
released to the district court and the State. Because of the concomitant deficient performance, 
Mr. Hughes suffered prejudice, thus establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
B. The District Court Erroneously Analyzed Mr. Hughes' Claim That His Attorney 
Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Obtain An Independent, 
Confidential Evaluation Such That The Evaluation Could Be Reviewed By Mr. Hughes 
And His Counsel Prior To The Release Of That Information To The District Court And 
The State 
Mr. Hughes asserted in his petition that his attorney, 
did not insure that defendant had an independent psychiatrist as part of the 
psychosexual evaluation, when the defendant had a right to the assistance of an 
independent psychiatrist and thus, did not determine, prior to sentencing, what 
"claims should be presented to the fact-finder or in interpreting the reports [sic] 
findings or rebutting the states [sic] evidence." 
(R., pp.8, 21.) The concerns with the psychosexual evaluation were articulated by trial counsel 
at sentencing, who requested a different or additional evaluation. (Tr. 30823, 3/26/2004, p.4, 
L.16-p.5, L.15.) The reason for the request was that the petitioner, through counsel, felt that, 
there were some issues of communication and trust between my client and the 
evaluator. There were two occasions when the evaluation was required, or the 
evaluator was required to contact my client. I think areas which the evaluator 
stated my client was deceptive he was in fact not deceptive, but the evaluator 
chose not to believe him. 
appointed by the court for purposes of a presentence investigation, counsel for Wood would have 
had the opportunity to advise his client of the possible uses of the information and of the 
privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 100, 967 P.2d at 714. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
noted that, "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than 
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation," Id at 690-691, thus establishing an 
attorney's obligation to engage in an investigation into relevant caselaw. The Strickland Court 
also noted the attorney's obligation to advocate for his client. Id. at 688. Idaho State Bar Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.1 requires an attorney to provide competent representation, including 
"the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter. .. the analysis of precedent ... [ and] 
detennining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve .... " (Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.1(1) and (2)). Moreover, in Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903 (5th Cir., 1981), 
although holding that that the attorney is not expected to foresee future new developments, that 
court noted that, "The decisions in [previous cases J make it clear that a failure of counsel to be 
aware of prior controlling precedents in even a single prejudicial instance might render counsel's 
assistance ineffective under the Sixth Amendment." Id at 908. 
In the case at bar, the district court made it clear that he would "very heavily" rely on the 
information in the PSI and told Mr. Hughes "It is important that you answer those questions fully 
and candidly." (Tr. 30823, l l/21/2003, p.31, Ls.6-10.) Therefore, Mr. Hughes asserts that his 
attorney should have known the importance of his answers to the PSI questions and should have 
protected his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination before it was violated. Here, that 
C. Conclusion 
Mr. Hughes asserts that the district court erred in incorrectly analyzing this claim and 
therefore, this claim should be remanded to the district court for the requisite factual and legal 
findings. 
A. 
B. 
V. 
District Court Erroneously Analyzed Whether Mr. Hughes' Trial Counsel Rendered 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To File A Motion To Suppress The Polygraph 
Introduction 
Mr. Hughes asserts that the district court erred when it granted the State's Motion to 
Dismiss on this ground, where the State incorrectly analyzed the issue of whether 
Mr. Hughes' attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the polygraph. 
The District Court Erroneously Analyzed Whether Mr. Hughes Trial Counsel Rendered 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To File A Motion To Suppress The 
Polygraph 
In his affidavit in support of his Petition, Mr. Hughes clarified the claim he was raising in 
his Petition, stating: 
The State accused the petitioner of deviant behavior thirty-five years ago, and told 
the petitioner they wanted to give him a polygraph test. The petitioner initially 
refused, but, he was told if he didn't the judge would "throw the book at him." 
The petitioner did not have an attorney present during the polygraph test, his 
Miranda rights were not read prior to the polygraph which was used at sentencing 
to assist the states case. His attorney never objected at sentencing. The polygraph 
should have been suppressed in court. 
(R., p.15.) Later, in his Affidavit of Derrick L. Hughes, Mr. Hughes wrote: 
When I was asked to take a polygraph, I told the police officer I did not want to 
take it, at least not without a lawyer present. The officers continued to badger me 
until I succumbed and took the test without an attorney present. Questioning in 
the polygraph concerned incidents which had occurred thirty years ago rather than 
1. Trial Counsel Was Deficient In Failing To Object Or Move To Suppress The 
Results Of The Polygraph Examination 
In order to show his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file 
a motion to suppress, the appellate courts examine "the probability of success of such a motion." 
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 976 P.2d 927 (1999). It is apparent that while Mr. Hughes trial 
counsel requested that his sentencing hearing be continued so that Mr. Hughes could obtain an 
independent evaluation, his trial counsel never object to, or moved to suppress the results of the 
polygraph test, which was given despite Mr. Hughes' requests to speak with his attorney. 
(Tr. 30823, pp.3 - 48), and despite the fact that counsel had notice of that error through, at a 
minimum, the comment in the psychosexual evaluation. (PSI, p.31.) Because Mr. Hughes was 
questioned, despite his request to speak with his attorney and that his attorney be present during 
the polygraph, his trial counsel was deficient for failing to object or move to suppress the results 
of the polygraph examination. (See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677 (1988) citing 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981) (holding that "a suspect who has 'expressed 
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by 
the authorities unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or 
conversations with the police."')) 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a defendant 
has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST amend. V. "The Fifth 
Amendment privilege is 'as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard,' and the 
privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... 
for such silence."' Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467-467 (1981) (internal citations omitted). A 
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (suspect's statement that "maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer" was not an assertion of the right to counsel); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d 
31, 36 (2001). As discussed in Sections II and III, and incorporated herein by reference, 
Mr. Hughes has established a Fifth Amendment right in the psychosexual evaluation, including 
the polygraph. See Estrada, 143 Idaho 558 at 563, 149 P.3d 833 at 838. 
Mr. Hughes alleged that he did request counsel prior to participating in the polygraph. 
(R., pp.8-9, 15.) The State asserted that Mr. Hughes did not "indicate in his allegation that he 
asked for counsel, or was refused the right to counsel, or even chose to not have counsel during 
the polygraph. (R., pp.63.) Mr. Hughes thereafter filed an Affidavit claiming, "When I was 
asked to take a polygraph, I told the police officers I did not want to take [the polygraph], at least 
not without a lawyer present." (R., pp.116-117.) This is supported by the PSI, of which the 
court took judicial notice wherein the polygraph examiner wrote, '(Note - Prior to participating 
in his polygraph on 2/11/04, Derrick stated he did not want to take the scheduled polygraph 
because 1. He hadn't talked with his attorney .... " (PSI, p.31.) Following the filing of this 
affidavit, the State filed another response, and, as to this particular claim, stated, "In his 
Affidavit, the petitioner reiterates his objections to taking a polygraph without a lawyer present, 
and to the subject matter of the polygraph. The State analyzed these issues in our Brief at pages 
9 and 11 and on other pages in the Brief." (R., p.124.) While the State moved for summary 
dismissal, 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised 
no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would 
entitle the applicant to the relief requested. A material fact has "some logical 
connection with the consequential facts [,]" Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th 
Ed.1999), and therefore is determined by its relationship to the legal theories 
presented by the parties. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 
1163 (Ct.App.1991). However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even 
VI. 
The District Court, Despite Finding That Mr. Hughes' Attorney Provided Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Advise His Client Regarding Participation In The 
Psychosexual Evaluation, Incorrectly Analyzed The Prejudice Prong Of The Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel Claim, And Thus, Erroneously Dismissed That Claim 
A. Introduction 
The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Hughes' trial counsel was deficient in 
failing to warn Mr. Hughes of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination prior to 
the psychosexual evaluation, but erred in concluding that Mr. Hughes did not suffer prejudice as 
a result of his counsel's deficient conduct. 
B. The District Court, Despite Finding That Mr. Hughes' Attorney Provided Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Advise His Client Regarding Participation In The 
Psychosexual Evaluation, Incorrectly Analyzed The Prejudice Prong Of The Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel Claim, And Thus, Erroneously Dismissed That Claim 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under 
both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 
of the Idaho Constitution. A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel extends to all critical stages of the prosecution where his substantial rights may be 
affected, and sentencing is one such stage. Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 874 P.2d 503 
(Ct. App. 1994) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, (1967)). Recently, the Idaho 
Supreme Court determined that a court-ordered psychological evaluation is a critical stage in 
which a criminal defendant "does have a right to at least the advice of counsel regarding his 
participation in the psychosexual evaluation." Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562-563, 149 
P.3d 833, 837-838 (2007). 
2. The District Court Erred In Concluding That Mr. Hughes Was Not Prejudiced By 
His Counsel's Deficient Performance 
The prejudice analysis is set forth in Section I, above, and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
C. Conclusion 
For the reasons listed above, Mr. Hughes requests that this Court find the post conviction 
court incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong, articulate the correct standard for determining 
prejudice where the Sixth and Fifth Amendment protections have been violated and thereafter, 
remand this case to the district court for the appropriate factual and legal findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hughes respectfully requests that this Court find that the district court erroneously 
dismissed Mr. Hughes' claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to be present during a 
psychosexual evaluation pursuant to both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, because although 
correctly finding that counsel was not present, it did not determine why counsel was not present, 
and thus remand this case on those issue for factual findings, if necessary, in light of the 
appropriate legal standards. Mr. Hughes would also like this Court to find his attorney rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to file a motion to suppress and the information 
contained in the unconstitutionally-obtained polygraph and when he failed to obtain a 
confidential, independent evaluation and review such evaluation with Mr. Hughes prior to the 
release of that information to the State and the court. Finally, M. Hughes requests that this Court 
articulate the correct test to determine the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis when the 
district court relied on a PSI and psyschosexual evaluation obtained in violation of Mr. Hughes' 
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